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In the last third of the 20th century, the Bielefeld School of social history, headed by Hans-
Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, rose to prominence. It had contrasting concerns: the focus 
on structures and processes of development sidelined intentional action and coexisted with a 
political rewriting of the past that indicted the interests and decisions of dominant elites in 
Germany from 1870 to 1933. History was viewed, oddly enough, as retrospective politics. 
This article analyses the main aporiae implied by both the School’s programme and its 
scholarly output. How did a structuralist historiography contrive backward-looking political 
denunciations? Is our time entitled to judge and accuse the past? Notwithstanding the 
weight of structures and processes, were there real alternatives for the historical agents? Did 
systemic causality grant elbowroom to intentional action? What chances were then missed 
and why? Overall, the surmise that there were always choices clashes with received narratives 
of inevitability.
***
In the last third of the 20th century, a German historiographic approach 
attained ascendancy. It chiefly focused on structures and processes of development, 
in lieu of the customary primacy given to intentional action. At the same time, 
a political revision of the past was envisaged. History was viewed as retrospective 
politics, which involved the vindication of its moral and didactic function.
This current is well known as ‘the Bielefeld School of social history’ and 
its most famous members have been Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, 
defenders of the innovative project they labelled ‘historical social science’ or 
historische Sozialwissenschaft. Most importantly, the Bielefeld School had 
contrasting concerns. On the one hand, these historians appealed to systemic 
causality, with a manifest disregard for intentional conduct; on the other, they 
decried the interests and projects held by influent groups and questioned the 
decisions they took. Specifically, the historians of the Bielefeld School denounced 
the defensive struggle set up by the old political, economic, and military elites in 
Germany from 1870 to 1933 with the chief aim of maintaining their privileged 
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status. Briefly, they defended a political history cast in terms of a structural 
approach.
Their resolve to rewrite the past, replacing intentional action by structures 
and processes of development brought to light by extrinsic theories, co-existed, 
oddly enough, with a penchant for retrospective political indictments from 
present-time viewpoints. We shall address this quandary while bringing into 
play the overarching query: Is the historian legitimated to be both the judge of 
the past and its public prosecutor?
1. Exogenous theories provide deep-level historical explanations
The three main characteristics of this innovative historiographical approach 
are: the reliance on exogenous theories; an unusual ontological commitment; 
and the stress on structures and processes along with a relative unconcern for 
intentions and actions.
a) The historians of the Bielefeld School rely on the instrumental and 
explicit application of externally originated or exogenous theories and models. 
One of their basic claims is that the past can, and must, be decoded from 
present-time theoretical viewpoints. If the past often seems able to explain the 
present, in its turn the past can be explained with the resources generated by 
present-time theories1 and models.
This historiographical programme is best defined by its dismissals. In the 
first place, it opposes the historicists’ self-confinement in context-bound values 
and criteria and fights their ‘epistemic fear’ of historiographical anachronism. 
(The explicit application of exogenous, ‘imported’ or ‘borrowed’ theories, 
as we will see below, comes ever closer to knowing the past as it was, not as 
their actors believed it to be.) In addition, the Bielefeld School combats the 
time-honoured habit of hiding the historian’s guiding concerns or ‘epistemic 
interests’ and defends their unrestricted display. It endorses a perspectivism of 
sorts: the past possesses a reality of its own upon which the ‘instrumental’ use 
of theories acts as a searchlight. The illumination thus obtained, however, is 
always piecemeal and tentative. The extrinsic theories are perception-enhancing 
devices, which never fully disclose the way ‘things actually were’ in the past. 
b) The Bielefeld School favours a weak ontological commitment. These 
scholars maintain that the historical reality itself furnishes a fuzzy ground for 
the applied theories. Yet they deny that society provides an ens realissimum-like 
1 The historians of the Bielefeld School are lucid on this issue: «Theories are explicit and con-
sistent conceptual systems that cannot be derived from the historical sources themselves but 
that can help us in identifying, unlocking (erschließen) and explaining historical phenomena». 
J. Kocka, Einleitende Fragestellungen, in Gegenstandsbezogene Theorien in der Geschichtswissen-
schaft, «Geschichte und Gesellschaft», Sonderheft III, 1977, p. 10.
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support to their explanatory endeavours. They also oppose the constructivist 
claim that social reality is a formless chaos, receiving structure and meaning 
from the pattern-bestowing perspective of the historian. On the contrary, in 
their view historical reality possesses ‘soft’ sui generis structures that the historian 
must uncover. While this historiography depends on ‘imported’ theories, Wehler 
names ‘relative constructivism’ its realist outlook2.
c) The historians of the Bielefeld School underscore structures and processes 
and not infrequently side-line perceptions, intentions, and actions. They reject 
the idiographic (i.e. focused on individuals and events) and hermeneutic (centred 
on the understanding of meaning) slant of the established historiography. Their 
fierce anti-historicism compels them to shift the historiographic stress on supra-
individual structures and long-term processes of development. Conversely, they 
often spurn individuals, intentions, and actions, and distrust the lived dimension 
of meaning and experience.
This anti-agency orientation of the Bielefeld School has been stressed by 
Wehler: «The motives of the actors cannot be made out only through their 
own concepts, or the action of the agents through their avowed motives, or 
the historical processes through intentional moves»3. These insufficiencies justify 
the resort to exogenous theories: «To elucidate both the antecedent conditions 
and the unintended consequences of action, which do not need to manifest 
themselves in concepts, motives and performances, externally-originated 
hypotheses are necessary»4. Such absolutist guidelines contrast with the more 
concessive view defended by Kocka:
The historical process is not identical with the experiences, intentions, motives, 
and actions of men [sic], but also includes structures and processes which influence 
those experiences, intentions, motives, and actions without being fully present within 
them5.
To sum up: instead of directly addressing motives, perceptions and 
experiences, this revisionist programme focuses on their conditions and 
consequences, which explains its concern for structures and processes of 
development. It tends to put aside the ‘subjective dimension’ and is not 
interested in reconstructing symbolic forms and interpreting cultural practices. 
The Bielefeld School contends that the explicit application of extrinsic theories 
leads to innovative hypothesis and eases the identification of problems. A theory-
2 H.-U. Wehler, Umbruch und Kontinuität, Munich 2000, p. 320.
3 H.-U. Wehler, Anwendung von Theorie in der Geschichtswissenschaft, in Theorie und Erzählung 
in der Geschichte, J. Kocka and Th. Nipperdey (eds.), Munich 1979, p. 28. 
4 Ibid.
5 J. Kocka, Theory and Social History: Recent Developments in West Germany, «Social Research», 
XLVII, 1980, p. 456.
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supported approach, in sum, furnishes explanations at a deeper level than those 
attained without the aid of theories.
2. Can the past be politically indicted? 
Is the historian a retrospective ‘know-it-all’? 
At first glance, the Bielefeld School’s stress on structures and processes 
scarcely leaves room for intentional action. Its ‘macro’ approach does not allow 
much leeway for the scrutiny of subjective meaning. Indicting past attitudes and 
decisions, therefore, outwardly seems incongruous6. It could even be surmised 
that the primacy given to structures and processes ‘exculpates’ in advance all 
historical actors.
By dint of this revisionist historiography, agency fades away amid 
structural constraints. Actions are epiphenomenal shadows and events are 
effects from structures, which evolve by their reciprocal, adaptive interaction. 
This contempt for contingency, incidentally, has been widely remarked. Ute 
Daniel, for instance, in her commentary of Wehler’s German Empire-book: «to 
the exculpating approach that does not exclude accident when accounting for 
the ‘German catastrophe’, Wehler opposes a version of the German historical 
continuity which is just a short way away (nicht mehr weit entfernt ist) from the 
claim of historical necessity»7.
The theory-driven historiography defended by the Bielefeld School 
leaves scarce margin for autonomous factors (those of political character are no 
exception) because all involved features (motives, intentions, side effects) are 
deemed interdependent. Causal explanations, in short, are replaced by functional 
ones, reliant on structural processes that work underneath actions and events. 
The historical actors are often converted into obedient carriers of a social role or 
dutifully performing occupants of a social position.
Yet a perplexing aporia comes into view, for in actual practice the historians 
of the Bielefeld School judge and indict past decisions and actions, intentions, 
and experiences. In fact, they propose a (mostly political) rewriting of the past 
and thus set up a ‘normative bent’ in historiography.
These historians, as pointed out above, consider that structures and 
processes are the proper object for historiography. Sometimes, however, their 
focus unexpectedly shifts on political decisions taken in past times and whose 
deeper meaning has been disclosed by present-day theories. Accordingly, the 
6 This incongruity is underscored by Wehler’s avowal of the necessarily truncated character of 
all historiographic endeavours: «In the human disciplines, knowledge remains partial, bound 
to precise epistemic intentions or cultural ideas of value (Weber), and prone to change again 
when these ideas change». Cf. H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte I, Studienausgabe, 
Munich 2008, p. 7. This admission is scarcely consistent with Wehler’s absolutist indictments 
of past decisions and events. If historians embrace Weberian constructivism, selecting the que-
ried material according to their own standpoint, how can they accuse anyone belonging to the 
past they ‘construct’?
7 U. Daniel, Kompendium Kulturgeschichte, Frankfurt/M. 2006, p. 422.     
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acting persons recover the convened leading role they seemed to have lost. The 
belief in the openness of history, i.e., that there were many futures attached 
to each past, becomes possible again. Thus, even within a restrictive structural 
framework, the responsibility of both individual and collective actors for the 
decisions they took in the past appears beyond discussion. This is the crucial 
paradox: the historians of the Bielefeld School profess a stern structuralism, but 
they often pour invective on the very past they survey with alleged ‘scientific’ 
detachment. They stand out in taking this past to court, where it becomes 
accused, indicted, judged, and condemned. As Thomas Nipperdey puts it, «In 
the Bielefeld School’s eyes, the historian is both the prosecutor and the judge in 
both the trial of the past and the resulting verdict»8.
The politically prescriptive aspects of the Bielefeld School entail what can 
be named its ‘normative bias’ and contrive its main aporia. Briefly stated, the 
historian is promoted to the role of «retrospective know-it-all (Besserwisser)»9. 
Such ennoblement affects the historiographical practice because it brings into 
view «the close dovetailing (Verzahnung) of the methodological-theoretical and 
political standpoints»10. The puzzling standpoint of the School, however, is best 
expressed by the following paradox. On the one hand, its account of the historical 
events in Germany prior to 1933 has been determinist and de-personalized. The 
path leading to Hitler’s access to power has been depicted as a one-way road, 
lacking side streets and opportunities for turning around. On the other hand, 
Bismarck’s responsibility in starting this process has been oddly highlighted. 
According to a persistent thesis, his one-time pre-eminence was a decisive cause 
of the ill-fated course taken by German history. (The tendency to incriminate 
the past, incidentally, is pervasive in present-day German historiography. While 
Wehler focuses on the traditional elites, other authors indict bourgeois or even 
links-slanted historical forces, for instance the liberal bourgeoisie in 1848-1849 
or the social-democrats in 1918-1919, accusing them of having ‘betrayed’ their 
respective revolution).
The fiercest charges against the aporiae entailed by the School’s programme 
have been brought by scholars with a neo-historicist mindset. (In this respect, 
it should be recalled that ‘historicism’ means the practice of understanding 
the past in its own terms instead of imposing on it a trans-historical standard 
drawn from neighbouring disciplines, or considering it teleologically in view of 
its consequences for the future). Admittedly, a theory-oriented historiography 
with revisionist entailments is not compatible with the historicist imperative of 
understanding every past episode solely by means of its own valuations. Hence 
the neo-historicist counterargument: Does it make sense for an historian to 
8 Th. Nipperdey, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie, Göttingen 1976, p. 388.
9 J. Kocka, Sozialgeschichte zwischen Strukturgeschichte und Erfahrungsgeschichte, in Sozialge-
schichte in Deutschland. Entwicklungen und Perspektiven I, W. Schieder and V. Sellin (eds.), 
Göttingen 1986, p. 29.
10 F. Becker, Koselleck und Wehler in Bielefeld, in Was war Bielefeld?, S. Asal and S. Schlak (eds.), 
Göttingen 2019, p. 105.
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apply norms that do not belong to the specific historical epoch under scrutiny, 
thus sidelining the actual self-perception of past actors?
The historian Thomas Nipperdey, already mentioned, focused his neo-
historicist misgivings on Wehler’s early work and accused him of reductionism. In 
his view, when Wehler becomes «simultaneously prosecutor and judge» and «puts 
the German Empire in the dock (Anklagebank)», in fact he is setting up «a trial 
against the great-grandfathers (Urgrossvätern)»11. Paul Nolte has acutely glossed 
these invectives: «In Nipperdey’s eyes, Wehler represented the historiographical 
trend that gauges the past with the measuring rod of the present time and then 
brandmarks it as scanty»12. Against Wehler, in sum, «Nipperdey claimed that 
the past must be understood according to its own logic by reconstructing the 
resultant horizons, [so that] objectivity remains a ‘regulative idea’, a Sisyphean 
target»13.
Nipperdey’s fierce criticisms of Wehler’s standpoint, however, could not be 
easily directed to Kocka’s stance. In fact, Kocka de-dramatizes the Bielefeldian 
approach and points the way to the counterarguments that will be discussed 
below:
The inquiry about the way persons influence history and how this differs from 
the effect of structures is only a particular case of the difficult task (quite unsolvable 
and so tiresome for the historians) of ascribing the corresponding weight to the diverse 
causes of a phenomenon and thus achieving a thorough causal imputation14.
Still, the strains highlighted by Nipperdey can be surmounted only by 
addressing this wide-embracing question: Is our present-time (or any time 
subsequent to the incriminated episode) entitled to valuing, judging, and 
accusing the past? According to Nipperdey, at any rate, in John Breuilly’s pithy 
report,
the first duty of the historian is not to write about the past in terms of its failure 
to turn into the present which the historian would have liked to have seen it become. 
Instead, the historian should respect the ‘otherness’ of the past and restore, in the 
portrayal of that past, its own sense of an open future15.
These injunctions entail the need to face head-on a crucial issue: Why 
did things not develop otherwise? What opportunities were then neglected and 
why? Which leads us to the quandary’s core: Can the historian accuse someone 
who acted under constraint, albeit not conscious of his or her servitude?
 
11 Th. Nipperdey, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie, cit., pp. 388-389.
12 P. Nolte, Lebens Werk. Thomas Nipperdeys Deutsche Geschichte, Munich 2018, p. 197.
13 P. Nolte, Nachwort to: Th. Nipperdey, Kann Geschichte objektiv sein?, Munich 2013, p. 319.
14 J. Kocka, Struktur und Persönlichkeit als methodologisches Problem, in Die Bielefelder Sozialge-
schichte, B. Hitzer and T. Welskopp (eds.), Bielefeld 2010, p. 180. Stress in the original.
15 J. Breuilly, Telling it as it was? Thomas Nipperdey’s History of 19th-Century Germany, «History», 
LXXX, 1995, p. 60.
© Lo Sguardo - rivista di filosofia
N. 29, 2019 (II) - Memoria e filosofia, vol. 2: memoria collettiva
169
3. Wehler’s rewriting of the past: actions and events
Despite his commitment to structures and processes, Wehler’s central 
concern is the relative autonomy of political history: «Wehler interprets politics as 
a manipulative business»16. His approach blends a stress on historical continuities 
(«the persistence (Zählebigkeit) of traditions»17) with the rejection of «the sharp 
separation of genesis and validity as a way to an objective representation»18, 
deemed a neo-conservative whim. Politics pervades Wehler’s thought with such 
intensity that K.-G. Faber’s severe judgment on his historiographical approach 
is hard to challenge: «Seeing a continuity of errors or even a fatal development 
in deep strata of the socio-political world amounts to doing retrospective 
politics»19. He indulges in «countless political value-judgements» so «massive 
and direct» that they often adopt «the character of a pamphlet»20. In the words of 
Arndt Hoffmann, «historiographic accounts always function argumentatively in 
Wehler»21. His backward-looking indictments, both in the German Empire-book 
and the German Social History wield the intensity depicted by Jonathan Sperber:
Wehler seems to be attempting to carry out on paper the revolution which never 
occurred in history. Privilege, oppression, and their latter-day academic defenders 
come under withering attack. Wehler retrospectively hangs the aristocracy from the 
lamppost22.
Yet Wehler’s accusatory practice is best brought to light by a sample of 
his retrospective political indictments. On the possibilities of modernization 
that were at reach during the Second German Empire, the ‘conservative egoism’ 
notwithstanding:
The power elites tenaciously defended their privileged bastion. […] A supple 
capacity for learning, or even the readiness to learn anything, war them foreign. They 
practiced instead a mere ‘pathological learning’ which consisted in the insight-less and 
obdurate affirmation of their status quo23.
16 H.-G. Zmarzlik, Das Kaiserreich in neuer Sicht?, «Historische Zeitschrift», CCXXII, 1976, 
p. 108.
17 H.-U. Wehler, Geschichtswissenschaft heute, in Stichworte zur Geistigen Situation der Zeit II, J. 
Habermas (ed.), Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 709.
18 Ibid., p. 749.
19 K.-G. Faber, Geschichtswissenschaft als retrospektive Politik?, «Geschichte und Gesellschaft», 
VI, 1980, p. 579.
20 Ibid., p. 575. Not only is Wehler’s historiography «retrospective politics», but also, according 
to K.-G. Faber, «a kind of ‘a-historical historiography’ that reads the past backwards». Ibid., p. 
579.
21 A. Hoffmann, Zufall und Kontingenz in der Geschichtstheorie, Frankfurt/M. 2005, p. 354. 
Even more concisely: «History is always argument in Wehler» (Ibid.)
22 J. Sperber, Master Narratives of Nineteenth-Century German History, «Central European His-
tory», XXIV, 1991, p. 79.
23 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV 1914-1949, Studienausgabe, Munich 2008, 
p. 200.
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In short, «strategies, measures, and processes of pathological and ingenuous 
learning were interwoven»24. On the naturalness of the struggle: «The bastion of 
conservative and aristocratic privileges did not need to be defended [in the last 
months of the First World War] because it was tacitly presupposed as the nervus 
rerum of the debate»25.
On the defensive attempt by the German power elites to preserve their 
privileged positions: «The pre-industrial elites defended their inherited positions 
of domination against the upsurge (Ansturm) of new forces. Eventually the 
obtained successes generated ever more dangerous tensions and built up a fatal 
legacy»26. And: «The traditional ruling elite of the landowning aristocracy […] 
defended its social and political privileges as vehemently and effectively as it 
did its economic interests»27. Or else, on the elites’ feeling that they were being 
trapped:
Major and dangerous developments seemed to multiply in the pre-war years, 
giving rise among the ruling elites to a sense of being forced into a corner. The result 
was that they were increasingly prepared to fight tooth and nail in defence of their 
position28. And in more general terms: «Ruling elites who find themselves in a defensive 
position with their backs to the wall become very much inclined to taking considerable 
risks to hold on to their position of dominance»29.
Finally, on the origins of the First World War:
The representatives of the German power elites knew that their decisions 
overstepped the margin between the risk of war and war itself. […] Their illusions of 
world power and their social-imperialist reckonings of legitimation prevailed upon the 
preservation of peace. […] A sharper perception of realities and a far-looking appraisal 
of interests could have brought a radical change of course, but they were not on hand 
because for a long time they had been hindered by a success story30.
These retrospective indictments share a characteristic that deserves to be 
highlighted. For instance, when Wehler bluntly expresses in the German Empire-
book his deep wish «to explain the disastrous (verhägnisvoll) path taken by 
German history»31, he is making a negative judgement on the defensive struggle 
of the German power elites to maintain and legitimate their prevailing political 
position. Yet ‘judging the past’ seems at first sight a weird practice because the 
24 H.-U. Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Göttingen 1973, p. 237. Id., The Ger-
man Empire 1871-1918, transl. by K. Traynor, Providence/Oxford 1985, p. 244.
25 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV 1914-1949, cit., p. 172.
26 H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich, cit., p. 14. Belongs to the Introduction not included in the English 
translation.
27 Ibid., p. 23. H.-U. Wehler, German Empire, cit., pp. 13-14. 
28 Ibid., pp. 197 and 198, respectively. This text re-appears verbatim in H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte III 1848-1914, Studienausgabe, Munich 2008, p. 1168.
29 Ibid.
30 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV 1914-1949, cit., p. 205.
31 H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich, cit., p. 11. Belongs to the Introduction not included in the English 
translation.
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past is unchangeable by definition32 and the sole judgment available to the 
historians is the impressionist verdict that opposes the historical phenomena 
they like to the ones they loathe.
 However, Wehler does not merely judge the past piecemeal, appealing to 
his personal scale of values. On the contrary, he summons a ‘counter-model’ that 
serves him to judge the German past because, so Wehler believes, it indicates 
the ‘normal path’ that German history should have taken and which would 
have prevented the catastrophe of the Nazi dictatorship. He sorts past events 
(especially in the German Empire-book) according to their agreement with this 
all-embracing counter-model. If ill matched, they automatically become a target 
for criticism.
The chosen counter-model is modernization. Wehler defines it by the 
characteristic array of West European and Nord-American peculiarities pointed 
out by the received ‘modernization theory’: political regulation, industrial 
growth, economy, and culture reached in these countries a dynamic state of 
reciprocal integration. The German trajectory, precisely, deviated from this 
path, whose prescriptive entailments have given rise to the expression ‘German 
exceptionalism’. In comparison with the healthier development of most Western 
countries, Germany followed an unusually defective track, caused by the absence 
of the sobering experience that a triumphant bourgeois revolution would have 
brought. The old-style, pre-industrial mindsets of the established elites embraced 
outdated political interests that prevented a self-ruled modernization. 
Most importantly, the Bielefeld School linked the theory of modernization 
to a negative view of the ‘special path’ or Sonderweg taken by German history. It 
should not be forgotten that before 1945 most German historians defended a 
positive version of the ‘special path’ thesis. In their view, the observed peculiarities 
were caused (and thus became justified) by the atypical situation of Germany 
from a geographical, confessional, and even historical viewpoint. By contrast, 
the Bielefeld School’s interpretation of the ‘German special path’ holds that, 
in John Breuilly’s words, «the direction taken by the development of German 
society war both peculiar and fateful». It happened, in sum, that «pre-modern 
cultural residues and a manipulative and authoritarian politics, together with 
the power wielded by modern industry, trade, army and bureaucracy, brought 
disastrous consequences for Europe»33. To conclude, Western modernization was 
the positive, normative model, from which the ‘German special path’ drastically 
deviated. This emancipatory aura gradually gained strength. If at first the 
reference to modernization had purely analytical aims, it steadily became a sort 
32 Can yesterday improve? [sic], however, is the title of a book by Jörn Rüsen that defends the 
magnifying-glass-like power of historiography. Thanks to the historian’s gaze, «what actually 
happened provides a sort of additional knowledge because it can display more facts than those 
of which the people involved were conscious». Cf. J. Rüsen, Kann gestern besser werden?, Berlin 
2003, p. 26.
33 J. Breuilly, Auf dem Weg zur deutschen Gesellschaft?, «Geschichte und Gesellschaft», XXIII, 
1997, p. 164.
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of rallying cry, of both political and scholarly character, against conservatism and 
relativism. (The difficulties attached to the ‘German special path’ thesis, and its 
eventual loss of credibility, will be discussed in section 5).
The German Empire-book provides a long-range structural explanation for 
the ‘German catastrophe’ and declares that the roots of the ‘German special 
path’ are its guiding concern. «How did it come about?» is the unvarying 
query of the book. In contrast with the future German Social History, however, 
which envisages the Weberian ‘objective possibilities’ attached to each historical 
episode (as will appear below), here the un-realized alternatives are not taken 
into account: Hitler was the unavoidable consequence of the Second German 
Empire. Conversely, the process of modernization in leading Western countries 
is displayed as a counter-model endowed with a bitingly critical function.
4. Kocka’s rewriting of the past: experience, intentions, and memory 
Kocka’s revisionism addresses strata of the historical reality deeper than 
those envisaged by Wehler’s criticisms. His rewriting proposals involve experience, 
intentions, and memory, and lay the foundation for Wehler’s indictments, 
directed to the more intricate reality of actions, decisions, and events. In Kocka’s 
peculiar take, action connotes contingency and defies regularity, even though 
he leaves no doubt about the upper hand kept by the structures. The acting 
individual is viewed as a sort of anomaly that veils the deeper rule, which must 
be brought to light by the historian.
In their first stage, Kocka’s rewriting proposals deal with the recovering 
or reconstruction of experience. There he stresses «the relative impotence of 
the individuals as regards the reality surrounding them»34. This helplessness is 
discussed by Kocka in his analysis of early German structural historiography, 
developed by Werner Conze in the 1950s and bent on «drawing the appropriate 
conclusions from a certitude which had been gaining weight in the 19th and 20th 
centuries: circumstances are all-powerful»35. Kocka spells out this all-pervading 
dearth:
The intentions of human acts often do not correspond to their outcome; 
the individual free-play of action, allowed by economy processes, social 
movements or political institutions, is strictly limited; history never coincides 
with the reciprocal intentions of the actors36.
According to Kocka, indeed, «history consists not only in assortments of 
actions and experiences but also in arrays of effects and functions that impose 
themselves against the efforts of the individuals, without necessarily being 
noticed by them»37. Not surprisingly, he advocates blending the history of 
memory and experience with that of evolving structures and processes. Yet the 
34 J. Kocka, Sozialgeschichte, cit., p. 71.
35 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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decisive insight of Kocka, on which his revisionist programme focuses, is that 
«much has happened that was not experienced by anybody, or in any case was 
experienced in a distorted way (vieles geschah, was nicht oder nur verzerrt erfahren 
wurde)»38.
Kocka insists in taking into account the power of structures: «Understanding 
what held together past realities and gave dynamism to them, demands the 
scrutiny of structural differences because the reconstruction of acts, experiences 
and ideas is by no means sufficient»39. Yet he does not despair of finding a proper 
balance between these opposed standpoints. His conclusion, therefore, should 
not come as a surprise: «The subjective or ‘inner’ face of past reality must be 
cross-examined because the history of perceptions and experiences is precisely 
what was neglected by the early structural historiography»40.
A further step in Kocka’s rewriting proposals promotes the methodical 
revision or replacement of experience, which is in fact a consequence of the 
foregoing discussion. In Kocka’s view, attempting to recover or re-enact meanings 
and experiences is an inadequate endeavour. «The historiographical focus on 
the perceptions and experiences of average people should not be accepted 
without reservations. History does not coincide with what people perceived and 
experienced»41. This defeatist insight is Kocka’s central persuasion. He considers 
a dismal undertaking any historiographical confinement to memory-bound 
subjective events that inevitably would neglect the symbolic networks that 
articulate them:
The simple reconstruction of experience is insufficient for grasping the total 
meaning of cultural phenomena. It is incompletely present in experience and possibly 
in a distorted form. Thus, a whole network must be properly decoded (entschlüsselt) 
which can never be wholly made out in experience42.
Yet Kocka is decided not to side-line the social roots of individual 
experience. He believes that (as Chris Lorenz puts it) «society registers better 
(stellt besser in Rechnung) than culture the phenomena of which contemporaries 
are not conscious»43 because experience can never totally embrace its cultural 
preconditions. He balances this clear-headed verdict with the following insight, 
quite perplexing for the historian: «the presence of structures and processes 
in experience is distorted or even inexistent, and inversely experience is never 
38 Ibid., p. 71.
39 Ibid., p. 73.
40 Ibid., p. 74.
41 Ibid. Kocka’s proposals for the correction, revision, or amendment of experience have dire 
historiographic consequences, for they imply that memory, in fact, has to be told of its actual 
contents. His methodological guidelines point to a historiography understood as criticism of 
memory.
42 Ibid., p. 78.
43 Ch. Lorenz, Wozu noch Theorie der Geschichte?, in Wozu Geschichte(n)?, A. Sommer et al. 
(eds.), Wiesbaden 2004, p. 14. Italics in original.
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altogether determined by structures and processes»44. This is why merely 
reconstructive programmes, according to Kocka, are a dangerous venture: 
«By its own means, the hermeneutic, understanding-directed recovering of 
past perceptions and experiences does not give access to a reflective and all-
comprehending reconstruction of history»45. Hence, Kocka’s startling question: 
Is experience corrigible?
Perceptions and experiences could even be ‘false’ (Wahrnehmungen und 
Erfahrungen konnten auch ‘falsch’ sein). […] The historiographical approach is fair 
enough and close to the historical truth when it succeeds in apprehending the actual 
circumstances of the people under study (besides focusing on their experiences and 
attitudes), which they may have only partially understood, or even not at all46.
In this approach, Kocka reveals a chief aspect of Max Weber’s influence 
on the Bielefeld School, namely the anti-historicist, constructivist, willingly 
anachronistic and heterological doctrine of the ‘imputed objective meaning’. 
According to Weber, although human action is never immediately meaningful, 
if rationally interpreted it can be understood and therefore explained. This 
‘rational interpretation’ takes the place left by the chimera of an immediate 
understanding and consists in the ideal-typical construction of the probable 
conduct of the agents in case they had acted rationally. Weber disparages given 
immediacy and directly accessible «lived experience»47 or Erlebnis:
The indistinct vagueness of ‘having an immediate experience’ must be broken, in 
order that even the first beginnings of a real ‘understanding’ of ourselves can be made. 
When it is said that every ‘immediate experience’ is the most certain of all certainty, 
this of course applies to the fact that we have that immediate experience. But the 
actual content of our immediate experience can only be grasped […] when the stage 
of ‘having an immediate experience’ as such has been left behind, and the content of 
the ‘immediate experience’ is made the ‘object’ of judgments that, for their part, are no 
longer ‘immediately experienced’ with indistinct vagueness, but can be acknowledged 
as ‘valid’48.
In Weber’s view, objectivised understanding is a disciplined procedure, 
fated to play the game of rationalization. Even ‘lived experience’ demands 
abstraction in order to be known. Understanding, therefore, is put to the 
service of explanation, i.e. it is subordinated to causal imputation because it 
consists in the interpretive reconstruction of rational motives. It opposes any 
44 J. Kocka, Sozialgeschichte, cit., p. 76.
45 Ibid., p. 74.
46 Ibid., p. 75.
47 What counts for Weber is not a lived, unique, and direct experience, immediately possessed 
and felt, but a reflexive and coherent experience, schooled in fantasy and abstraction but nur-
tured by general rules.  
48 M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, ed. by J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 
1988, p. 104. Id., Collected Methodological Writings, ed. by H. H. Bruun and S. Whimster., 
transl. by H. H. Bruun, London 2013, p. 67 (Weber’s stresses).
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soft introspective procedure because the initial interpretation of the subjective 
motivations is integrated back into an objective explanation. 
This Weberian breakthrough throws light on Kocka’s tenet that there can 
be false experiences. A ‘constructivist memory’ appears thus possible, which 
would be the contrary of the reproductive or restorative memory expressed by the 
metaphor of the palimpsest. It would replace the lived and directly remembered 
experience (i.e. the experience that can be rescued or reconstructed), by the 
paradoxical experience that took place without the knowledge of the pertinent 
individual. This extreme proposal, of course, implies that the historical actors 
were unconsciously self-betraying dupes. Since their experience was poor and 
mistaken, it is also corrigible throughout. In sum, according to Kocka ‘experience’ 
is externally amendable through the light-beam supplied by exogenous theories. 
Only they can retrospectively disclose the ‘true’ intentions of past agents and 
their ‘actual’ involvement with their world.
5. The shortcomings of modernization 
theory and functional justification
The political rewriting of the past defended by the historians of the Bielefeld 
School has been exposed to criticisms which, in their turn, have set off renewed 
attempts to buttress their revisionist claims concerning past deeds, intentions 
and experience. There have been controversies on three issues. The Bielefeld 
School’s aporiae have had to confront neo-historicist disparagements; its appeal 
to a modernization theory as the counter-image of the ‘German special path’ has 
become gradually discredited; and the functionalist justification of the School’s 
main theses has steadily evidenced grave failings.
The Bielefeld School’s programme encourages a two-pronged scrutiny of 
both the contemporary account of past realities (in fact, an insincere nod to neo-
historicism) and our own, present-time-related perception of them:
A key academic tradition was nevertheless preserved when structural history began 
to prevail: the hermeneutic reconstruction of past intentions, actions, and experiences. 
In fact, structuralist histories used to be the exception. But the hermeneutic questioning 
became progressively complemented and improved by the inquiry on the conditions 
and consequences of intentions, actions and experiences, of which the people who 
acted and felt in past times could not be aware because they were out of their reach49.
It was a two-sided agenda which nevertheless concealed a justification 
of anti-historicism: «The historian must tackle these two tasks [i.e. finding 
the terms that guided the past actors and disclosing an objective historical 
meaning via our present-time viewpoint] and not only the first one, a historicist 
49 J. Kocka, Historische Sozialwissenschaft zu Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts, in Arbeiten an der 
Geschichte, Göttingen 2011, p. 83.
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illusion notwithstanding»50. Just the opposite happened, for only the second task 
succeeded. The programmatic eclecticism of the School was reduced to the 
willed anachronism described by Thomas Haussmann: «What matters is not the 
way reality appeared to people who lived in the past, but everything that can be 
found out about the reality of foregoing times»51. 
Despite an occasional bow to the historicist tradition, a robust anti-
historicism hovers above the Bielefeld School’s mindset. Wehler, for instance, 
gives utmost importance to «the meaning that historical actions acquire when 
viewed from present-time theoretical standpoints»52, a claim that expresses the 
need for exogenous sources of intelligibility. Small wonder, then, if structures and 
processes of development prevail upon intentional motives for action, though 
the question remains whether this deeper ‘reality of foregoing times’ includes 
intentions, decisions, and experiences. If this were the case, the indictments 
against past historical episodes would be justified.
The anti-historicism of the Bielefeld historians explains their fierce 
opposition to what they called «the neo-historicist illusion». This invective 
alluded to «the pre-Kantian and pre-Weberian fata morgana» which consists in 
«approaching historical phenomena without pre-conceptions, without clearly 
stating the guiding concerns of the historian»53. Regarding historiographical 
practice, however, ‘anti-historicism’ meant for the School the rejection of old-
style political history and its two attached opacities:
a) Traditional historiographies are unavoidably partial. While the School’s 
explicit theoretical orientation takes this drawback for granted (historians have 
always to select their sources, yet to a greater degree if they use theories taken 
from neighbouring disciplines), the question remains of why some theories 
appear more appropriate than others. The ensuing difficulty demands a balanced 
approach: «Several theories can be legitimately applied to a given historical object, 
which yet would not allow any conceptualization. But it grants a limited scope 
(Spielraum) wherein different theories can be summoned without risk of deceit 
or inaccuracy»54. This uncertainty is aggravated by the fact that «adequate criteria 
for favouring a theory over another cannot be proved or deduced, though only 
they could avoid the charge of decisionism»55.
50 H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich, cit., p. 12. Belongs to the Introduction not included in the English 
translation. My stress (JMB)
51 Th. Haussmann, Erklären und Verstehen: Zur Theorie und Pragmatik der Geschichtswissen-
schaft, Frankfurt/M. 1991, p. 252. My stress (JMB). Haussmann adds: «Understanding is of no 
use for this task, which can only be solved by summoning present-day theoretical standpoints» 
(Ibid.)
52 H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich, cit., p. 12. Belongs to the Introduction not included in the English 
translation.
53 H.-U. Wehler, Aus der Geschichte lernen, Munich 1988, pp. 140 and 142.
54 J. Kocka, Einleitende Fragestellungen, cit., p. 10.
55 Ibid.
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b) Old-style historians never state their guiding concerns. Arguing against 
this cause of ambiguity, the historians of the Bielefeld School advocate the 
explicit disclosure of historiographic pre-conceptions. Likewise, the criteria used 
for selecting the sources must be brought to light. In fact, though, in the work 
of these historians an outstanding ‘guiding concern’ becomes spelled out: How 
did the ‘German special path’ or Sonderweg come about?
The revisionist claims of the Bielefeld School concerning the ‘German 
special path’ deserve to be looked at closely. We should not forget that these 
historians judge unsatisfactory, in Jürgen Habermas’ words, «the hermeneutic 
understanding of meaning, because the historical context is not exhausted by the 
mutual intentions of human beings (der historische Zusammenhang geht nicht in 
dem auf, was die Menschen wechselseitig intendieren)»56. Therefore, they devaluate 
action and agency and highlight structures and processes. Yet here appears the 
difficulty. Is it legitimate that they foster a ‘retrospective politics’ and indict the 
power elites and dominating groups responsible for the ‘German special path’, 
now converted in a political counter-model? Is it reasonable that, as a result, the 
decisions taken by ruling strata, alongside with the tradition of wrongdoing that 
has been their obvious outcome, receive a deluge of charges and imprecations?
In Wehler’s later output, however, the ‘German special path’ comes up 
enfeebled. John Breuilly has described this decline along with the growing 
presence of unexpected factors that were functionally interpretable:
In German Social History (notably in the third volume) the classical interpretation 
of the German ‘special path’ appears amended and even partially abandoned. […] Yet 
the weakening of some of its aspects is balanced by the introduction of new viewpoints, 
i.e. the growth of a nationalism converted into a political religion, or the careless and 
irrational decision-making when the German political structures fluctuated between 
polycracy and un-coordinated drifting along (dahintreiben)57.
The supporters of the modernization theory (Wehler and Kocka among 
them), upon which the ‘special path’-thesis depended, did not pay enough 
attention to the following issues. The processes of modernization (the 
circumstance that they were profoundly diverse justifies the plural) in no way 
occurred simultaneously; phenomena of inner differentiation affected the 
German ruling classes in the period under scrutiny, for the established order was 
not monolithic, nor was it immune to the social and political consequences of its 
own defensive stance; modernity was at bottom ambivalent (for instance, it has 
been proved that the development and influence of the bourgeoisie in Germany 
56 J. Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Frankfurt/M. 1967, p. 116. Id., On the Logic 
of the Social Sciences, transl. by S. W. Nicholsen and J. A. Stark, Cambridge (Mass.) 1988, p. 
35. Habermas clarifies thereafter the grounds of his aperçu: «Motivated actions are embedded 
in a quasi-natural (naturwüchsig) context that is mediated by subjectively intended meaning, 
but not created by it» (Ibid.).
57 J. Breuilly, Auf dem Weg zur deutschen Gesellschaft?, cit., p. 165.
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did not differ from that of comparable social strata in Western countries); the 
relative stability of the German empire propitiated some remarkable social-
progressive achievements; several possible courses for the political life in Germany 
were then outlined that differed from the ‘German special path’ but were not 
taken up in subsequent times.
The primacy given to a normative process of modernization, besides, 
meant that the Bielefeld School had to rely on functional accounts. In other 
words, explaining how and why history has proceeded forward in ways of which 
the people involved could not be conscious was left to the idea of function. 
The historical events, in short, were functional solutions given to structural 
problems. Promoted to a sort of litmus test, they assigned intentional overtones 
to the structures themselves.
A sort of ‘functional necessity’ was then brought to light, which according 
to Wehler was precisely what the German elites had failed to acknowledge. 
Functionalist accounts, however, side-line the relative self-sufficiency of historical 
processes and wipe out the agents’ virtual freedom of choice. Wehler, at any 
rate, partially disclaims in German Social History the functionalism attached to 
modernization theory. The pursuit of realist alternatives58 attains in this work 
the hegemony reached by functionalism in his earlier output, a change of course 
pointed out by his neo-historicist adversary:
If the German Empire-book was a programmatic sketch, full of functionalist 
blunders, the German Social History distinguishes at length and accurately between 
conditions and consequences and avoids mixing up intentions and outcomes (though 
the role of intentions is rather subordinate). […] Wehler’s use of counterfactual 
questionings brings to light alternatives and options that were available at the time59.
In short, the functionalism of the earlier work, ancillary to modernization 
theory (which was also the main support of the “special path” approach), is now 
swapped for a Weberian focus on objective (even if unrealized) possibilities. Let 
us see this sea change in detail.
6. The legitimacy of the heterological discourse
In view of the chain of difficulties pointed out above, how could Wehler 
and Kocka persist in their attachment to a structuralist and process-bound 
historiography, yet drenched with revisionist indictments of past decisions and 
actions? As we just saw, Wehler eventually realized the frailty of the Bielefeld 
School’s prior arguments (modernization theory and functionalism) when 
58 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte II 1815-1845/49, Studienausgabe, Munich 
2008, p. 878, n. 9 contains a lengthy repudiation of «older theories of modernization» that 
linked the growth of democracy with industrialization.
59 Th. Nipperdey, Wehlers Gesellschaftsgeschichte, «Geschichte und Gesellschaft», XIV, 1988, p. 
405.
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attempting to justify its retrospective denunciations. As a result, he directed his 
attention to Max Weber’s doctrine of ‘objective possibility’ when working in 
German Social History. This was not an exceptional occurrence because Weber’s 
impact in the Bielefeld School’s mindset60 had in fact three aspects:
a) The heritage of Weber’s objectively imputed consciousness (which goes 
beyond Kocka’s proposals for the amendment of experience, already discussed) 
retrospectively justifies the School’s ‘presentism’. This standpoint is expressed by 
Wehler in the German Empire-book when he stresses the need of asking «not only 
for the meaning which oriented the historical actors among the experiences that 
were possible in their time, but also the meaning their historical action acquires 
when viewed from present-time theoretical standpoints»61. In Wehler’s view, this 
request «critically dissipates the fog of inherited legends, dissolves hackneyed 
confusions, [and] sharply highlights the upshots of carried-out decisions (or 
the social cost of having eschewed others)»62. Interestingly, it closely follows 
Weber’s objectivating63 guidelines: human action can be accounted for only if 
it is virtually transposed into its rational equivalent, which means in fact that 
no one is fully conscious of his or her actual motives. Weber deemed irrational 
the established views on understanding, and this anti-hermeneutic mistrust is 
echoed by the historians of the Bielefeld School. They look for an anti-historicist 
‘understanding’ which, paradoxically, would begin by disregarding the very 
experiences had by the people whom they attempt to understand. Again, they 
walk in Weber’s steps, for he opposed the ‘objective motivation’ of an action to 
the lived (re)enacting of its subjective motives. 
b) Weber’s ‘objective possibility’ or objektive Möglichkeit (Wehler’s last 
resort when modernization and functionalism came out disappointing) is a 
procedure for uncovering realist but unrealized alternatives to past situations. It 
aims at disclosing the opportunities that lie buried in history because they were 
60 Wehler and Kocka invoke in fact a ‘halved’ or halbierter Weber. Of the two faces of Weber’s 
oeuvre (one related to society, economy, authority, dominance and politics, the other linked to 
action theory, the construction of meaning, the ‘conceptions of the world’ and their determin-
ing effects), they address only one of them. Yet the talk of ‘a halved Weber’ is awkward because, 
as action theorist, Weber held the revisionist claim later adopted by the Bielefeld School: the 
objective motivation of the agents can only be attained by way of their objectively imputed 
consciousness.
61 H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich, cit., p. 12. Belongs to the Introduction not included in the English 
translation.
62 Ibid.
63 Weber’s objectively imputed consciousness is a forerunner of György Lukács’ «imputed 
(zugerechnet) class consciousness», the key concept of his History and Class Consciousness of 
1923. It is a ‘consciousness’ paradoxically not actually and immediately ‘experientiable’ and 
thus merely possible, not an empirically factual consciousness. Lukács’ insight, besides being 
ancillary to Weber’s, is grounded on the hypothesis of a proletarian consciousness having the 
‘objective possibility’ of breaking through the veil of reification. Lukács was aware that full 
class-consciousness was an exceptional event that can emerge only in a deep crisis, so that it 
must be ascribed to the working class.
© Lo Sguardo - rivista di filosofia
N. 29, 2019 (II) - Memoria e filosofia, vol. 2: memoria collettiva
180
not achieved. It is related to the Weberian ‘adequate causation’, at first sight 
annuls the exculpation of past agents, and echoes the virtualized view adopted 
by some historians, Tim Mason among them: «the significance of what actually 
happened can only be determined against the background of what the evidence 
shows might have happened or almost happened»64. It is worthwhile to consider 
Weber’s specific take on that notion:
If a historical fact had been removed from the complex of relevant contributory 
factors, or if it had been modified in a certain way, could events then, according to 
general rules of experience, have taken a course that, in those respects which are crucial 
for our interest, would somehow have been different65 ?
Positioned in Weber’s wake, Wehler is adamant about the necessary 
realism when disclosing alternatives to past states of affairs. Any alleged objective 
(though unrealized) possibility must confront the suspicion of illusionism and 
arbitrariness. He discusses this constraint regarding the advent of National-
Socialism in Germany:
This query must follow Weber’s so-called ‘theory of objective possibilities’. At 
the outset it asks for all opportunities of action and decision that were available at a 
given historical moment and thereafter tries to find out why all these options (with the 
exception of the winning one) were defeated and so went down in historical memory 
as obstructed, buried, or even forgotten alternatives66.
Such an exploration is necessary, according to Wehler, «if from the beginning 
we do not want to fall prey to the historical events that emerged victorious 
in history, thus ratifying that their success was inevitable»67. Accordingly, the 
quest for “objective yet un-realized possibilities” is ubiquitous in German Social 
History68. Wehler insists in asking for «alternatives with realist prospects», that is, 
«competing options which belong to the buried (verschüttet) possibilities of the 
German history»69. Instances: Were there realist alternatives to the foundation 
of the German Empire in 1867/1871?70 Id. to the institution of the Republic of 
Weimar in 1919? 71 Id. to the advent of the National-Socialist regime in 1933? 72
64 In a debate on R. Overy, Germany, ‘Domestic Crisis’ and War in 1939, «Past and Present», 
CXXII, 1989.
65 M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, cit., p. 283. Id., Collected Methodologi-
cal Writings, cit., p. 179. (Weber’s stresses)
66 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV, cit., pp. 585-586.
67 Ibid., p. 585.
68 Again, Nipperdey is a lucid analyst of the historian’s need to summon un-realized possibil-
ities: «There is historiographical advancement only when it can be pointed out what chances 
and possibilities were available as alternative. Only on this account can we speak about some-
thing resembling ‘guilt’ (Schuld)». Cf. Th. Nipperdey, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie, cit., pp. 265.
69 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte III 1848-1914, Studienausgabe, Munich 2008, 
p. 331.
70 Ibid.
71 H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV, cit., p. 205.
72 Ibid., p. 585.
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c) Weber’s ‘charisma’ is a spare explanatory resource. Wehler takes this 
notion from Weber and uses it to overcome the occasional ineffectiveness of the 
structuralist procedures. He pragmatically applies the theories needed by each 
specific historical phenomenon, and so he discards socio-economic explanations 
(suddenly turned out ineffectual) when attempting to account for the National-
Socialist dictatorship in the fourth volume of the German Social History. Instead, 
Hitler’s undisputed ‘charisma’ becomes there the main clarifying device.
Coming back to the Bielefeld School’s difficulties, we may conclude that 
some crucial questions have not been thoroughly addressed: Were the alternatives 
of action for the indicted historical agents, the weight of structures and processes 
notwithstanding? Is it necessary to confront the possibilities and dangers set by 
an ‘alternative history’, that is, the ‘history that could have been’? In other words: 
What elbowroom was allowed by a given situation, what opportunities were 
then missed and why? Did structures and processes, by dint of their possible 
ill-fit and overlapping, grant a margin of manoeuvre for intentional actions and 
rational decisions? If so, did these interstices give rise to a sort of ‘paradoxical 
agency’? What alternatives were at hand, in each concrete situation, for the 
historical actors?
These queries boil down to deciding whether appropriate narratives of 
inevitability could prevail over the certitude that there were always choices. 
Bluntly put: is the ‘culture of denunciation’ fostered by the Bielefeld School 
actually «unfair vis-à-vis our grandfathers», as the neo-historicists pretend? 
Above these issues hovers the general problem posed by the legitimacy of the 
heterological discourse, which insists on accounting for past times exclusively 
in terms of our present views, disregarding context and relying on sheer 
anachronistic transplantation. Principally, it denounces the hollowness and the 
mendacity of the revised past73. The confidence in exogenous theories displayed 
by the Bielefeld School, precisely, is an outstanding instance of heterological 
discourse. 
Now is time to take stock. The addressed problems amount to whether a 
subjective remainder persists unaffected by structures, and this remnant can be 
the focus of historiographical inquiry. Kocka deals with this issue by explaining 
why the Bielefeld School’s structuralist programme is compatible with a 
politically inculpatory rewriting of the past:
It is not possible to seamlessly deduce a given event, way of acting or even a 
person from structures that explain their necessary character because they went before 
73 The heterological discourse avoids linking history with collective remembrance. Memory has 
often worked interwoven with forgetfulness, yet what has been left out has usually prevailed. 
As the Jewish historian Yosef Yerushalmi has pointed out: «Is it possible that the antonym of 
‘forgetfulness’ is not ‘remembrance’ but ‘justice’?». Cf. Y. Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History 
and Jewish Memory, Washington 1982. The rational understanding of the perpetrators’ motives 
should not obliterate the memory of the victims.
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or sustain them right now. Often remains a residue that does not necessarily result from 
previously disclosed structures74.
Yet Kocka admits as well that the problem has not been thereby solved. 
The reminder undeniably exists, but it confronts the historian with a menacing 
epistemic void:
This residue resists every structural approach, but it would be absurd to make it 
the starting point (or the chief aim) of an inquiry, unless we wish to free the historian 
from the task of explaining. When a structural explanation has become unattainable, 
withdrawing to what is just individual amounts to admitting defeat75.
A revelatory remark by Wehler provides the necessary bridge connecting 
imposed historical inevitability with intentional action, strategic necessity 
with accountable agency, or as Kocka puts it, the inescapable character of the 
structures with the subjective «residue» that resists structural approaches:
N.B. for ‘neo-traditionalists’: [the applied theories] might not be corroborated 
by contemporary ‘direct’ sources. Nevertheless, they can be inferred from the rationale 
of what lay in the interests of the ruling groups and which was incorporated into 
patterns of political behaviour. They can establish themselves over the heads of those 
involved, as a response to a challenge, but can after the fact still be interpreted as akin to 
deliberate actions, because they were strategic necessities (sind dennoch im Nachhinein 
in der Form strategische Bedürfnisse wie intentionales Handeln interpretierbar)76.
The extrinsic interests imposed themselves, therefore, «over the heads 
of those involved», but since they were strategic necessities they can also be 
decoded, «after the fact», as analogous to subjective intentional actions. This 
keystone locks both sides of the dilemma into position. Bringing into close 
relationship external necessity and spontaneous agency is the first step into a 
dualist approach (structures exhibit an intentional character and vice versa, not 
unlike the way wave and particle theories complement each other in modern 
physics) that would overcome the chief quandary confronted by the School. 
Either structural necessity shapes all historical processes (those contrived by the 
dominant classes being no exception), and therefore no action or event of the 
past is open to criticism. Or the German dominating elites, through blindness, 
inaction, or incompetence, failed to build up the right strategies and take the 
appropriate measures, which rules out an exclusively structural approach and 
justifies the School’s retrospective political indictments.
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74 J. Kocka, Struktur und Persönlichkeit, cit., pp. 180-181.
75 Ibid.
76 H.-U. Wehler, Kaiserreich, cit., p. 247, note 25. Id., German Empire, cit., p. 255, note 25 
(translation amended).
